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Abstract
Objective To examine the effect of attending a medical school with an
active policy on restricting gifts from representatives of pharmaceutical
and device industries on subsequent prescribing behavior.
Design Difference-in-differences approach.
Setting 14 US medical schools with an active gift restriction policy in
place by 2004.
Participants Prescribing patterns in 2008 and 2009 of physicians
attending one of the schools compared with physicians graduating from
the same schools before the implementation of the policy, as well as a
set of contemporary matched controls.
Main outcome measure Probability that a physician would prescribe a
newly marketed medication over existing alternatives of three
psychotropic classes: lisdexamfetamine among stimulants, paliperidone
among antipsychotics, and desvenlafaxine among antidepressants.
None of these medications represented radical breakthroughs in their
respective classes.
Results For two of the three medications examined, attending a medical
school with an active gift restriction policy was associated with reduced
prescribing of the newly marketed drug. Physicians who attended a
medical school with an active conflict of interest policy were less likely
to prescribe lisdexamfetamine over older stimulants (adjusted odds ratio
0.44, 95% confidence interval 0.22 to 0.88; P=0.02) and paliperidone
over older antipsychotics (0.25, 0.07 to 0.85; P=0.03). A significant effect
was not observed for desvenlafaxine (1.54, 0.79 to 3.03; P=0.20). Among
cohorts of students who had a longer exposure to the policy or were
exposed to more stringent policies, prescribing rates were further
reduced.
Conclusion Exposure to a gift restriction policy during medical school
was associated with reduced prescribing of two out of three newly
introduced psychotropic medications.
Introduction
In 2002 the American Medical Student Association established
a PharmFree Campaign to advocate for evidence based, rather
than marketing based, prescribing. As part of these efforts, the
association released the first “PharmFree scorecard” in 2007,
which graded US medical schools on the presence or absence
of a policy regulating interactions between students and faculty
and representatives of the pharmaceutical and medical device
industries. Since the first PharmFree scorecard was adopted,
the number of US medical schools with conflict of interest
policies has grown exponentially and most now have policies
restricting gifts.1 The American Medical Student Association’s
approach to advocating against conflicts of interest among
physicians is distinctive for its focus on medical students and
medical education. Several organizations have suggested codes
of conduct for ethical behavior to establish standards to regulate
physician-industry collaborations, including the American
Medical Association,2 the American Association of Medical
Colleges,3 and the Pharmaceutical Research andManufacturers
Association,4 5 but each predominantly focuses on interactions
with practicing physicians or academic investigators.
Studies conducted before the PharmaFree Campaign found that
most medical students were exposed to marketing efforts during
their medical education.6 On average, students either received
a gift or attended an industry sponsored event weekly.7Exposure
to marketing efforts by the pharmaceutical industry during
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medical school has been associated with favorable attitudes
towards the pharmaceutical industry.6 7 Furthermore, marketing
efforts have been shown to reduce the time to new drug
adoption8 and increase the probability that a physician will adopt
a new drug.9 Research has found that educational interventions
strongly influence students’ attitudes toward pharmaceutical
marketing10 11 and are associated with increased support for
policies banning interactions between representatives of
pharmaceutical companies and students.11 Similarly, students
attending a medical school with restrictive marketing policies
tend to have less favorable attitudes about promotional items
than their peers who were not exposed to a conflict of interest
policy12 and are less likely to trust the advice they receive from
representatives of pharmaceutical companies.13 Although
research has found that educational interventions and conflict
of interest policies are associated with increased skepticism
about pharmaceutical marketing, the effect of medical school
gift restriction polices on subsequent prescribing remains
unknown.
We studied the impact of attending a medical school with a gift
restriction policy on the adoption of new drugs. To see whether
attending a medical school with a gift restriction policy affected
prescribing of new drugs, we used a difference-in-differences
design to examine the effect of attending a school that
implemented a gift restriction policy by 2004. Although such
an examination represents an early evaluation of these policies
because of the lag time between physician medical education
and independent clinical practice, understanding whether these
policies achieve their goal of limiting marketing influence is
important given the rapid increase in the number of schools
adopting such policies. Using data from IMS Health, which
includes national prescribing data from retail pharmacies in the
United States, we examined the adoption of new drugs in three
classes of psychotropic medications.
Methods
We examined physician prescribing of newly introduced
medications within the stimulant, antipsychotics, and
antidepressant classes. Data on prescriptions for these three drug
classes written between July 2008 and March 2009 were
obtained from IMS Health’s Lifelink LRX longitudinal
prescription database. The database contains anonymous
individual prescriptions from about 33 000 retail pharmacies,
independent pharmacies, and mass retailers. Over 60% of retail
prescriptions in the United States are covered in the database.
Compared with census data, IMS Health’s database is
geographically representative and representative by sex, age,
and insurance coverage. We linked IMS Health’s data on
prescriptions to the American Medical Association’s physician
masterfile using a deidentified prescriber number on both
datasets in order to categorized prescribers by specialty, year
of graduation from medical school, and medical school from
which the physician graduated. The physician masterfile is a
comprehensive source of data on bothmembers of the American
Medical Association and non-members that contains information
on roughly 1.4 million physicians, residents, and medical
students. The primary variables of interest for this analysis from
the masterfile, medical school attended and graduation year, are
obtained from the medical schools themselves and are time
invariant.14 Accordingly, the accuracy of these components of
the database is less sensitive than other elements to requests for
updates from the American Medical Association.
Medical school gift restriction policies
Using internet searches, as well as information contained in the
Institute of Medicine as a profession’s conflict of interest
database and the American Medical Student Association’s
PharmFree scorecard, one investigator (CE) either determined
the initial implementation date of the gift restriction policy for
medical schools that had a policy or verified that the school did
not have a policy in place by the end of our study period for
87% (119/133) of accredited medical schools in the United
States. The Institute of Medicine’s database contains over 700
conflict of interest policies from 125 academicmedical centers.15
In developing its database, the organization first contacted
academic medical centers directly requesting a written policy
and then searched the websites of academic medical institutions
for relevant policies. Response rates to using the Pharmfree
scorecard, which was first published in 2007, were low in its
initial years but had a 98% participation rate in 2012.1 The
primary goal of the scorecard is to assess the strength of conflict
of interest polices, but the scorecard also contains summaries
of the policies, updates, and links to school’s policies. Given
the low participation rate for using the scorecard in early periods,
it was primarily used for identifying schools that implemented
restrictive policies in 2008. Both of these sources are regularly
updated, which could have led us to omit schools that had
revised their policy but did not include a revision date. However,
given the legal nature of gift policies, revision dates are typically
included on documents. After we had obtained the dates of
policy implementation, a second investigator (MK) then verified
the dates on the policies included in the study.
Study groups
We identified 14 medical schools with a policy that explicitly
prohibited or restricted gifts as of 2004. A restrictive cut-off
date of policy implementation by 2004 was necessary to allow
for the average time required to complete postgraduate residency
training after graduation from medical school for physicians to
be eligible to independently prescribe medications by July 2008,
the beginning of our prescribing observation period. Many of
the schools that had a policy in place by 2004 had adopted
policies as a result of state laws or military restrictions governing
gifts. The policies varied in strength from almost complete bans
on gifts to much weaker and ambiguous restrictions. Of the
schools identified with policies in place before 2004, 79%
(11/14) were identified through the Institute of Medicine’s
conflict of interest database, two additional schools (14%) were
obtained through the cooperation of authors of a 2009 study
that surveyed the deans of medical schools and found that 10
schools had a conflict of interest policy in place in 2005,7 and
the final school was obtained through internet searches. The
supplementary file contains a complete list of schools with
additional details on implementation dates.
Next we identified two cohorts of physicians to permit
comparisons among thosewho attended the samemedical school
before and after implementation of a gift policy. The first cohort
included physicians that graduated two years before the policy
was implemented and therefore were not exposed or affected
since the policy was enacted after they had graduated. The
second cohort graduated in 2003 or 2004, after implementation
of the policy.
Matched controls
To account for changes in prescribing over time, we created a
matched control sample composed of physicians who graduated
from 20 different medical schools that adopted a policy
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restricting gifts in 2008. Of the schools identified, all were found
-using information obtained from the American Medical
Students Association PharmFree scorecard. These physicians
were never exposed to the policy since they graduated before
implementation. We used a matched design to randomly select
control physicians based on year of graduation, specialty, and
10ths of prescribing volume.
Main outcome measure
To determine the effect of gift restriction policies duringmedical
training on prescribing as physicians, we examined physicians’
propensity to prescribe newly introduced and marketed
psychotropic medications over older medications in the same
class. During our study period, antipsychotics, antidepressants,
and stimulants were among the top selling classes of
medications, with US sales ranks of 1, 5, and 15, respectively.16
Stimulants, antidepressants, and antipsychotics were also among
the most promoted classes of medications.17 Given the
importance of these three classes of medications to the
pharmaceutical industry, we identified a newly marketed
medication in each class for our study: lisdexamfetamine
(Vyvanse; Shire, Wayne, PA) among stimulants, paliperidone
(Invega; Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Titusville, NJ) among
antipsychotics, and desvenlafaxine (Pristiq; Pfizer, New York,
NY) among antidepressants. Lisdexamfetamine was introduced
in March of 2007, paliperidone in December of 2006, and
desvenlafaxine in February of 2008. Although the drugs
examined in this study vary in their level of innovation, none
represented radical breakthroughs in their class and all relied
on mechanisms of action already available on the market. These
medications were the only oral medications within the three
classes of data that we had access to that were approved within
our study period.
Statistical analysis
We used a difference-in-differences method to examine the
effect of a gift restriction policy on physicians’ subsequent
propensity to prescribe a new drug. A difference-in-differences
analysis is a quasi-experimental technique, which we used to
compare prescribing patterns of physicians who attended a
school with a gift restriction policy when the policy was in place
with those of physicians who attended the same school before
the policy was in place, as well as with the prescriptions written
by the two matched control groups.
Using this design, we compared prescribing patterns using three
sets of logistic regression models for each class. The dependent
variable in all of the logistic regressions was whether the
prescription was written for one of the three newly marketed
medications. Firstly, we carried out multivariate logistic
regression including a dummy variable that was equal to 1 if a
physician attended a school with a policy during the period
when the policy was in place, a time dummy set equal to 1 if
the student graduated in 2003 or 2004, and school fixed effects,
which allowed us to estimate the effect of exposure to the policy
on the odds that a physician will prescribe a newly introduced
medication. In addition, the models accounted for method of
prescription payment (Medicaid, third party, or cash), sex and
specialty of the physician, and the physician’s total number of
in-class prescriptions. All models incorporated clustered
standard errors to adjust for the clustering of observations within
physicians, as well as school fixed effects. The school fixed
effects capture any non-time varying differences between
schools, including those that might influence whether or not a
school adopted a policy.
The two additional sets of models test whether duration of
exposure to the policy or the strength of the policy were
associated with stronger policy effects. In one set of models,
we included only students graduating from a school that had
adopted a policy by 2002 in the policy group. Students attending
these nine schools would have at minimum been exposed to the
policy for at least half of their graduate education. In an
additional set of models we included only graduates of 11
schools that had clear monetary limits on gifts in the policy
group.
Results
Overall, 7.8% (10 234/13 1342) of stimulant prescriptions were
written for lisdexamfetamine, 1.3% (1081/82 420) of
antipsychotic prescriptions were written for paliperidone, and
0.5% (2686/574 554) of antidepressant prescriptions were
written for desvenlafaxine. In total, 27.8% (681/2449) of
prescribers wrote at least one prescription for lisdexamfetamine,
8.7% (102/1172) at least one prescription for paliperidone, and
6.9% (345/4981) at least one prescription for desvenlafaxine.
Table 1⇓ summarizes the characteristics of the physicians in
our study. There were compositional differences between
schools that adopted gift restriction policies before 2004 and
later adopters, as well as between cohorts, in specialty
composition and methods of payment.
Stimulant prescribing—lisdexamfetamine
Physicians who were exposed to a gift restriction policy during
medical school were significantly less likely than non-exposed
physicians to prescribe lisdexamfetamine over older stimulants.
Of prescriptions written by physicians who attended a medical
school with an active gift restriction policy, 5.9% (95%
confidence interval 5.6% to 6.3%) were for lisdexamfetamine,
in contrast with 7.4% (7.1% to 7.6%) among physicians not
exposed to a policy who graduated from the same school before
the policy was implemented. Amongmatched controls attending
a school that implemented a policy in 2008, 8.3% (8.1% to
8.6%) and 9.1% (8.7% to 9.4%) of prescriptions were for
lisdexamfetamine among earlier and later graduates,
respectively. Differences between these groups were significant
(P≤0.001).
Using a difference-in-differences approach showed that
attending a medical school with an active conflict of interest
policy significantly reduced the odds that a physician would
prescribe lisdexamfetamine, the newly introduced stimulant,
over older stimulants (adjusted odds ratio 0.44, 95% confidence
interval 0.22 to 0.88; P=0.02; table 2⇓). In the analysis
examining the duration of the policy and its strength, a further
reduction occurred in physicians’ propensity to prescribe
lisdexamfetamine. For physicians who attended amedical school
in which they would have been exposed to a policy for longer
than the group exposed to the policy in our main analysis, the
odds of prescribing lisdexamfetamine was further reduced
(adjusted odds ratio 0.21, 0.09 to 0.51; P=0.001; table 3⇓).
Attending a school with a strong active policy also reduced the
odds of prescribing lisdexamfetamine (adjusted odds ratio 0.40,
0.18 to 0.88; P=0.02; table 4⇓), which is slightly smaller than
the odds ratio reported in the main analysis.
Antipsychotic prescribing—paliperidone
Physicians who were exposed to a gift restriction policy during
medical school were significantly less likely than non-exposed
physicians to prescribe paliperidone over older antipsychotics.
Of prescriptions written by physicians who attended a medical
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school with an active gift restriction policy, 0.5% (95%
confidence interval 0.4% to 0.7%) were for paliperidone, in
contrast with 1.7% (1.6% to 2.0%) among physicians who were
not exposed to the policy and graduated from the same school.
Among matched controls attending a school that implemented
a policy in 2008, 1.2% (1.1% to 1.3%) and 1.4% (1.1% to 1.6%)
of prescriptions were for paliperidone among the earlier and
later cohorts, respectively. Differences between these groups
were significant (P≤0.001).
Using a difference-in-differences approach, attending a medical
school with an active conflict of interest policy was associated
with a significantly decreased odds of prescribing paliperidone,
the newly introduced antipsychotic (adjusted odds ratio 0.25,
95% confidence interval 0.07 to 0.85; P=0.03; table 2). The
odds ratios for the analyses examining the duration and strength
of the policy were slightly lower, with an odds ratio of 0.20
(0.04 to 0.96; P=0.05; table 3) in the analysis of duration and
0.21 (0.06 to 0.72; P=0.01; table 4) in the models examining
policy strength.
Antidepressant prescribing—desvenlafaxine
Exposure to a gift restriction policy during medical school was
not associated with differential prescribing of desvenlafaxine.
In all three models using a difference-in-differences approach,
attending a medical school with an active gift restriction policy
was not associated with significantly decreased odds of
prescribing desvenlafaxine, the newly introduced antidepressant.
In the main model, the odds ratio for students exposed to an
active conflict of interest policy was 1.54 (95% confidence
interval 0.79 to 3.03; P=0.20; table 2). Results were also
insignificant in models examining students who were exposed
to the policy for a longer duration (adjusted odds ratio 0.82,
95% confidence interval 0.35 to 1.92; P=0.64; table 3) or were
exposed to a stricter policy (1.00, 0.47 to 2.12; P=0.98; table
4). The results of each of the three analyses for desvenlafaxine
were largely driven by the relatively high level of prescribing
among physicians in the early cohort of the matched control
group compared with the other groups.
Discussion
Implementation of a policy to restrict the receipt of gifts from
the pharmaceutical industry at US medical schools was
associated with significantly reduced prescribing of two out of
three newlymarketed psychotropic medications among students
once they reached clinical practice. The odds of prescribing a
newly marketed stimulant and a newly introduced antipsychotic
medication were reduced among physicians who graduated from
a medical school that had an active gift restriction policy. The
propensity to prescribe these two newly introduced medications
was further reduced if the students were exposed to the policy
for a longer duration or if the policy was relatively stringent.
Our findings suggest that conflict of interest policies, which
have been increasingly adopted by medical schools since 2002,1
may have the potential to substantially impact clinical practice
and reduce prescribing of newly marketed pharmaceuticals.
Limitations of the study
Our study has several limitations. Firstly, we were able to
examine only schools that adopted a policy before 2004 to allow
adequate time for physicians to complete residency and begin
independent prescribing. To the extent that schools adopting
policies before 2004 are different than schools adopting policies
later, our results may differ. However, since our results include
school fixed effects, this helps assuage concerns that the
differences we observed may be due to differences between
schools that implemented gift restriction policies by either 2004
or 2008, rather than the policy itself, since the school fixed
effects absorb any non-time varying differences between the
schools. In addition, many of the schools included in our analysis
adopted policies because of state or military regulations, rather
than as a result of internal school dynamics. While this helps
mitigate concerns about selection bias in the policy population,
the choice to adopt a policy, rather than having it imposed on
schools, may generate different results.
As an early analysis of the effect of gift restriction policies, our
focus was limited to the impact of gift restriction policies
enacted by medical schools by 2004. These were among the
first policies established among US medical schools. These
early policies were typically more limited in scope and less
stringent than policies normally implemented by schools in
recent years.1 Many of the schools in our analysis have
subsequently adopted more stringent policies, which makes our
analysis a strong test of the effect of gift restriction policies.
One critical question that our analysis cannot disentangle is
whether the effect on prescribing we observed is due to the
policy itself or to educational efforts that may have accompanied
the implementation of the policy. In our analysis that examined
the strength of the policy we found slightly stronger effects for
more stringent policies, suggesting that educational efforts
surrounding policy implementation may also be important.
Based on a large body of social science research, which has
found that even small gifts can have a substantial impact on
behavior,18 we expect that more restrictive policies may have a
greater impact on prescribing of newly marketed medications.
Future research examining differences in prescribing behavior
among physicians exposed to policies that completely ban gifts
compared with limiting the size of gifts would help shed light
on this important topic. Similarly, disentangling whether the
effects of policies are moderated by the educational efforts that
accompany their implementation will require future research.
Another potential limitation, common to retrospective analyses
of policy, is that our analysis may not have captured all early
adopters. This is particularly true if a policy was revised but the
date of the revision was not included on the more recent policy.
In addition, we were unable to examine the role that residency
plays in moderating the effect of exposure to a gift restriction
policy in medical school. If physicians attending schools with
gift restriction policies disproportionately attend residency
programs that also maintain gift restriction policies, this could
make disentangling the effects we observe difficult. However,
there is substantial heterogeneity among students within medical
school classes and a great number of residency programs,
mitigating our concerns. Finally, we were unable to assess the
effect of gift restriction policies on medical school faculty since
our data do not provide information on current institutional
affiliations.
Our analyses were also limited to prescribing of three newly
marketed psychotropic medications since we did not have data
on other classes of medications. We cannot be certain that the
same associations would have been observed for prescribing of
other medication classes. Given that each of the three
medications we examined are a reformulation of a product on
the market, we did not have the ability to examine how these
policies might affect the adoption of medications that are clear
improvements over existing alternatives.
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Conclusion
Our study provides some early preliminary evidence that
exposure to a gift restriction policy during medical school may
reduce the likelihood that a physician will prescribe newly
introduced medications over older alternatives within the same
drug class. In instances where the newly introduced medication
is a noticeable improvement over alternatives, such an effect
could slow the diffusion of medical advances. In instances where
the newly introduced medication offers no additional benefit to
patients, such an effect may limit the unnecessary use of newer,
more expensive brand name medications, potentially slowing
the escalation of healthcare costs. Future research examining
the effect of these policies on medications with varying levels
of innovativeness is necessary to establish whether medical
school gift restriction policies reduce prescribing of all newly
marketed medications or affect prescribing selectively.
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What is already known on this topic
Medical school policies restricting gifts to physicians from the pharmaceutical industry are becoming increasingly common
The effect of such policies on physician prescribing behavior after graduation into clinical practice is unknown
What this study adds
For two of the three medications examined, attending a medical school with an active gift restriction policy was associated with reduced
prescribing of the newly marketed drug
Among cohorts of students who had a longer exposure to the gift restriction policies or were exposed to more stringent policies, prescribing
rates were further reduced
Tables
Table 1| Characteristics of physicians and prescriptions by categorization of school and class of medication. Values are percentages
(numbers) unless stated otherwise
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Table 2| Any US medical school with a policy on restriction of gifts from pharmaceutical industry before 2004
Antidepressant (desvenlafaxine)Antipsychotic (paliperidone)Stimulant (lisdexamfetamine)
Variables P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)
0.201.54 (0.79 to 3.03)0.030.25 (0.07 to 0.85)0.020.44 (0.22 to 0.88)Exposed to policy
0.350.81 (0.52 to 1.26)0.731.17 (0.48 to 2.89)0.101.26 (0.96 to 1.66)Period of exposure
0.101.02 (1.00 to 1.03)0.031.04 (1.00 to 1.08)<0.0011.05 (1.03 to 1.08)Prescribing volume
(100s)
0.660.94 (0.73 to 1.22)0.0031.92 (1.24 to 2.97)<0.0010.67 (0.55 to 0.81)Cash payment
0.020.50 (0.28 to 0.90)0.021.65 (1.09 to 2.50)0.070.82 (0.66 to 1.02)Medicaid payment
0.221.53 (0.77 to 3.06)0.033.83 (1.18 to 12.4)0.0010.61 (0.46 to 0.80)Psychiatry
0.081.72 (0.94 to 3.12)0.920.93 (0.26 to 3.36)<0.0010.46 (0.35 to 0.59)General medicine
0.411.14 (0.83 to 1.57)0.861.07 (0.53 to 2.13)0.690.96 (0.77 to 1.18)Male
Third party is the omitted insurance category. Other is the omitted provider specialty. All models include school fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by prescriber.
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Table 3| Any school with a policy for gift restriction from pharmaceutical industry before 2002
Antidepressant (desvenlafaxine)Antipsychotic (paliperidone)Stimulant (lisdexamfetamine)
Variables P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)
0.640.82 (0.35 to 1.92)0.050.20 (0.04 to 0.96)0.0010.21 (0.09 to 0.51)Exposed to policy
0.280.78 (0.51 to 1.22)0.721.19 (0.46 to 3.08)0.071.28 (0.98 to 1.69)Period of exposure
0.281.01 (0.99 to 1.03)0.111.03 (0.99 to 1.07)<0.0011.06 (1.04 to 1.09)Prescribing volume
(100s)
0.640.93 (0.71 to 1.24)0.011.89 (1.16 to 3.09)0.0010.70 (0.57 to 0.86)Cash payment
0.190.67 (0.36 to 1.22)0.041.70 (1.04 to 2.78)0.220.86 (0.68 to 1.09)Medicaid payment
0.381.42 (0.65 to 3.10)0.024.75 (1.33 to 16.9)<0.0010.52 (0.38 to 0.72)Psychiatry
0.121.73 (0.87 to 3.43)0.910.92 (0.22 to 3.88)<0.0010.44 (0.33 to 0.58)General medicine
0.451.15 (0.80 to 1.64)0.091.80 (0.92 to 3.50)0.870.98 (0.78 to 1.24)Male
All models include school fixed effects. Third party is omitted insurance category. Other is omitted provider specialty. Standard errors clustered by prescriber.
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Table 4| Schools with strict policies on restriction of gifts from pharmaceutical industry
Antidepressant (desvenlafaxine)Antipsychotic (paliperidone)Stimulant (lisdexamfetamine)
Variables P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)P valueOdds ratio (95% CI)
0.981.00 (0.47 to 2.12)0.010.21 (0.06 to 0.72)0.020.40 (0.18 to 0.88)Exposed to policy
0.310.80 (0.51 to 1.24)0.751.16 (0.47 to 2.85)0.101.26 (0.96 to 1.66)Period of exposure
0.211.01 (0.99 to 1.03)0.031.05 (1.01 to 1.09)<0.0011.06 (1.03 to 1.08)Prescribing volume
(100s)
0.590.93 (0.70 to 1.22)0.011.86 (1.19 to 2.90)<0.0010.66 (0.54 to 0.80)Cash payment
0.040.51 (0.27 to 0.98)0.021.60 (1.09 to 2.33)0.060.79 (0.62 to 1.01)Medicaid payment
0.321.46 (0.70 to 3.06)0.044.21 (1.11 to 16.0)<0.0010.57 (0.42 to 0.77)Psychiatry
0.181.55 (0.81 to 2.94)0.881.12 (0.26 to 4.76)<0.0010.47 (0.35 to 0.62)General medicine
0.271.22 (0.86 to 1.73)0.810.91 (0.45 to 1.86)0.590.94 (0.75 to 1.18)Male
All models include school fixed effects. Third party is the omitted insurance category. Other is omitted provider specialty. Standard errors clustered by prescriber.
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